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IN-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND THE McNABBMALLORY RULE-A PROPOSAL
Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, enacted
in 1944, provides that any person making a valid arrest "shall take
the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest
available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the United
States." Despite this and similar state provisions, the question
whether an illegal delay in pre-arraignment procedure renders
inadmissible an otherwise acceptable confession made during this
period is one which has plagued courts for a quarter century.
Although the United States Supreme Court has at least nominally
faced this problem on several occasions, the precise posture of
these decisions is uncertain. A pronounced split of authority in
state courts, and to a somewhat lesser degree in federal courts, has
followed.
The problem to be considered in this Comment involves four
major elements. First, the arrest of the suspect is presumed
valid.1 Second, the suspect must have been adequately advised of
his rights in conformity with the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,2 and he must have fully and intelligently waived
these rights. Third, an "unnecessary" delay between arrest and
arraignment must have occurred. Finally, the confession 3 obtained
during this delay must have been uttered completely voluntarily. With these factors met, the problem becomes one of the admissibility of the statements into evidence 4against the accused in
a criminal trial in which he is the defendant.
HISTORY AND

DEVEwPMENT OF THE PROBLEM

History in the Supreme Court
The first case generally acknowledged as attempting to meet
1. For a discussion of the effect of an illegal arrest upon a subsequent voluntary confession see Comment, Voluntary Incriminating Statements Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest-A Proposed Modification of
the Exclusionary Rule, 71 DicK. L. REv. 573 (1967).
2.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3. For purposes of this Comment, no distinction is made between
confessions and admissions. "Confession," as used herein, merely means
an incriminating statement.
4. The scope of this Comment encompasses only the restrictions inherent in the last sentence. Thus related questions, such as the use of a
confession merely to impeach a witness, or the use of a confession of one
defendant as evidence against another defendant, are not considered. Similarly, the use of an inadmissible confession in a civil or quasi-criminal
case is not treated. Finally, the question of a "reaffirmance" of a prior
inadmissible confession will not be discussed.
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the question whether violation of this or a similar prior provision
rendered inadmissible any incriminating statement made during an
illegal detention was McNabb v. United States.5 Although often
cited as demanding the exclusion of all confessions obtained during
an "unnecessary delay," McNabb involved such an intimation of
coercion and involuntariness" that the validity of this contention
is uncertain.
In 1944, United States v. Mitchell7 was decided. For a brief
period, it was thought that this case had defined the limits of
McNabb:
Inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an accused, and the successful extraction
of such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning
for many hours under psychological pressure were the
determinative factors in the McNabb case which led us to
rule that a conviction on such evidence could not stand.8
Mitchell, however, involved a confession obtained shortly after
the arrest-followed by a delay in arraignment. Four years later
Upshaw v. United States9 distinguished Mitchell on this basis.10
Upshaw, which involved a defendant who was questioned more or
less continuously for thirty hours, was held to "fall squarely within
the McNabb ruling and is not taken out of it by what was decided
in the Mitchell case."" That Upshaw provided an appropriate situation for the invocation of McNabb is conceded, yet in this fact
lies the weakness of the proposition that Upshaw, or even Upshaw
plus McNabb, demands that all2 confessions made during a violation
of rule 5 (a) must be excluded.'
Mallory v. United States," the last of the cases giving rise to
the "rule" of absolute exclusion, was decided by the Supreme Court
5. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
6. Two members of the McNabb family were arrested for complicity
in the fatal shooting of a federal revenue agent and were questioned
continuously for thirty hours before a confession was obtained. A third
member of the family, arrested later, was questioned for six hours before
confessing. These men were members of a Tennessee mountain clan and
none had gone beyond the fourth grade in school. No friends, relatives,
or counsel were permitted to see the McNabbs until after the confessions
were obtained. The place of interrogation was a barren room with no
place to sit except on the floor. Finally, at least one of the men was
forced to completely strip while being questioned.
7. 322 U.S. 65, reh. denied, 322 U.S. 760 (1944).
8. Id. at 69-70.
9. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
10. Id. at 412.
11. 335 U.S. at 412.
12. Another factor in Upshaw which may have been in the Court's
mind was that the arresting officer testified that the reason the defendant

had not been taken before a magistrate at once was because there was "not
a sufficient case," and that once the defendant was arraigned, the officer
would no longer be able to question him. 335 U.S. at 414.
13. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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in 1957. There the delay was a mere seven and one-half hours.
The argument that Mallory along with Upshaw and McNabb demand automatic exclusion is still not completely convincing, however, for even Mallory contained distinguishing factors. First,
the defendant was nineteen years old and of limited intelligence.
Secondly, the language of the Court itself weakens this argument:
"The duty enjoined upon arresting officers to arraign 'without
unnecessary delay' indicates that the command does not call for
mechanical or automatic obedience. Circumstances may justify a
brief delay between arrest and arraignment .... -14 Just what
circumstances justify a delay and how brief that delay must be are
questions which obviously have given other courts much room to
justify individual decisions.
Although McNabb, Upshaw and Mallory form the basis for the
so-called federal rule of exclusion, the development of this line of
reasoning does not end here. More recent Supreme Court cases
have a definite relation to the question of when a voluntary confession must be excluded. Wong Sun v. United States,15 although
dealing with an illegal arrest rather than an illegal detention, propounded a rationale which has a decided bearing on the problem.
That case held that admissibility of a confession depends upon:
"whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint"; 6 whether the
connection between the prior illegality and the confession "had
'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' 1, Although the
Supreme Court has not yet applied this language to a situation
involving a confession made during a violation of 5(a), it is submitted that the similarities of the two situations are so great as
to warrant this extension of the "taint" test. 8
Furthermore, as will be discussed later, the rationale of recent decisions such as Miranda v. Arizona has had a distinct effect
on the reasons underlying the McNabb-Mallory rule, to the extent
that the rule no longer serves its original purpose.' 9 Thus, considerable doubt remains both as to when the exclusionary rule
should be applied and to how 20 it should be applied.

14. Id. at 455.
15. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
16. Id. at 488, quoting from MAGUIRE, EVmENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
17. 371 U.S. at 491, quoting from Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939).
18. The "taint" test has been applied to other situations and currently
seems to be in favor with the Court. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
19. It should be noted, however, that the Court in Miranda stated that
its decision was not intended to overrule McNabb-Mallory but rather that
the two "rules" were to exist coextensively. 384 U.S. at 463n.32.
20. A related question which will not be discussed at this point is
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The Rule in the Lower Federal Courts
Since both rule 5(a) and the decisions of the Supreme Court
are binding upon all federal courts, these courts would presumable apply the McNabb-Mallory rule uniformly. That they do not
becomes apparent after examining some of the many cases on point.
Although most federal courts have strictly applied the exclusionary rule to confessions obtained in violation of rule 5(a),21 a few
cases have held that a causal relation is needed before an illegal
detention will invalidate a confession.2 2 These latter decisions
seemingly adhere to a Wong Sun type of test. An effort to restrict
the effect of McNabb-Mallory can be seen in other ways. In
United States v. Gorman,23 the Second Circuit recently held that a
state officer making an arrest for a federal crime need not obey
rule 5(a) or its state counterpart, even though the confession ob24
tained during an undue delay was to be used in a federal court. 25
doctrine
platter"
"silver
It would seem that a version of the old
was employed.
whether a violation of rule 5(a) requires an automatic reversal of any
conviction supported by a confession obtained in violation of its provisions.
Whether such is required, or whether a harmless error test can be applied,
poses a most interesting question. Its application will be proposed at a
later point in this Comment, based in part upon language of the Supreme
Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which would appear to support this proposal.
21. See, e.g., Butterwood v. United States, 365 F.2d 380 (10th Cir.
1966) (dictum), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967); Young v. United States,
344 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1965) (dictum); Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Virgin Islands v. Solis, 334 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1964); Jones v. United States,
307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Ginoza v. United States, 279 F.2d 616 (9th
Cir. 1960); United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum);
Speers v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
22. See, e.g., Bright v. United States, 274 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1960);
Joseph v. United States, 239 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1957). Watson v. United
States, 234 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1956), seems to require a similar test. However, while never overruled, the Watson standard seems to have been
largely ignored by later decisions of the same court. See, e.g., Jones v.
United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) and Ricks v. United States, 334
F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
23. 335 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1964).
24. Id. at 156. See also Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d 848, 856
(5th Cir. 1967) and Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363, 370 (8th Cir.
1967), where the same reasoning was employed.
25. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), discarded the original
"silver platter" doctrine, which had permitted state officials to hand over
evidence of a federal crime to federal officers even though the evidence
was come at through a search and seizure which would have been illegal
for federal officials to conduct. The language in Elkins supports the view
that the Court was relying, at least in part, upon its supervisory powers to
reach its decision; therefore, since the McNabb-Mallory rule rests upon the
same basis, it is submitted that these powers would similarly forbid the
action of the Gornan court should the question be raised. See 364 U.S. at
216.
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Similarly, it has been held that the McNabb-Mallory rule is
not available for collateral attack. 26 The apparent rationale is
that no constitutional right is violated by an illegal detention;
only a procedural rule is being violated. This is true of any application of McNabb-Mallory,27 but the rule remains a mandate of the
Supreme Court, based on a proper exercise of its supervisory
2
powers, 28 and it binds all federal courts.
It is submitted that these attempts to circumvent the McNabbMallory rule evidence the lower federal courts' dissatisfaction with
the rule, a disaffection more prevalent than is apparent from the
available case law.
The Rule's Development in State Proceedings
Since there is no federal constitutional basis for the McNabbMallory rule,80 the states are not bound to apply its provisions.
Although some writers have felt differently,31 the state courts have
unanimously recognized this inapplicability.8 2 Most states, however, have statutory or quasi-statutory provisions similar to fed26. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798 (1st Cir. 1959).
Accord, United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1959).
27. The McNabb Court stated that although the Constitution forbids
the use of coerced confessions, there is no constitutional provision precluding the use of voluntary ones. The Court said that in excluding the "voluntary" confessions of the McNabbs, it was merely exercising its supervisory powers over federal courts. 318 U.S. at 332, 341, 347. See also
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948): "Our holding is not
placed on Constitutional grounds." There is no indication that this does
not remain true at the present.
28. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, 347 (1943).
29. For cases dealing with the right of the Supreme Court to exercise its supervisory powers, and to thereby bind lower federal courts, see,
e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1937).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. See, e.g., Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB.
L. REV. 483 (1963).
32. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446 (1958); Rogers
v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955); State v. Traub, 151
Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964); Webster
v. State, 213 A.2d 298 (Del. 1965); People v. Novak, 33 Ill. 2d 343, 211 N.E.
2d 235 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1016 (1966); People v. Kees, 32 Ill.
2d 299, 205 N.E.2d 729 (1965); Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d
362 (1954); State v. Dobney, 199 Kan. 449, 429 P.2d 928 (1967); Commonwealth v. Chase, 350 Mass. 738, 217 N.E.2d 195 (1966); State v. Nelson, 139
Mont. 180, 362 P.2d 224 (1961); Brown v. Justice's Court, 428 P.2d 376 (Sup.
Ct. Nev. 1967); State v. Lavallee, 104 N.H. 443, 189 A.2d 475 (1963); State
v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156, 188 A.2d 10, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 852 (1963);
People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961);
People v. Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); State v. Shipley, 232 Ore. 354,
375 P.2d 237 (1962); Reimers v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 457, 143 N.W.2d 525 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980 (1966); State ex rel. Van Erman v. Burke, 30 Wis.
2d 324, 140 N.W.2d 737 (1966).
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eral rule 5(a) .1 Despite these provisions, the overwhelming majority of states have rejected the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary
principle. 4 Apparently only Delaware and Michigan have elected
to follow this rule,3 5 and Delaware, at least, has done so only to a
limited extent.3 6 Neither state adopted the rule because it felt
that the Federal Constitution required it.37
33. See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 825, 849 ("without unnecessary delay,
"); ILL. ANN. STAT.
and, in any event, within two days after ... arrest ..
ch. 38, § 109-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.872(1) (Supp.
1965) (deals only with an arrest made without a warrant. There appears
to be no corresponding provision for arrests made pursuant to a warrant);
N.Y. CODE: CIM. Pnoc. §§ 158, 165; PA. R. CRiM. P. 116(a) (Supp. 1964).
See generally the excellent compilation of state prompt production statutes
in Appendix IV of the American Law Institute, Tentative Draft No. 1, A
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (1966). See also McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-43 n.7 (1943).
34. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446 (1958); People
v. Hilliard, 221 Cal. App. 2d 719, 34 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1963); People v. Freeland, 218 Cal. App. 2d 199, 32 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1963) (dictum); People v.
Gauthier, 205 Cal. App. 2d 419, 22 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1962); State v. Traub,
151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964); People
v. Novak, 33 Ill. 2d 343, 211 N.E.2d 235 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1016
(1966); People v. Kees, 32 Ill. 2d 299, 205 N.E.2d 729 (1965); People v.
Reader, 26 Ill. 2d 210, 186 N.E.2d 298 (1962); Pearman v. State, 233 Ind.
111, 117 N.E.2d 362 (1954); State v. Dobney, 199 Kan. 449, 429 P.2d 928
(1967); Commonwealth v. Chase, 350 Mass. 738, 217 N.E.2d 195 (1966);
State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023
(1966); State v. Nelson, 139 Mont. 180, 362 P.2d 224 (1961); Brown v.
Justice's Court, 428 P.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1967); State v. Lavallee, 104
N.H. 443, 189 A.2d 475 (1963); State v. Mihoy, 98 N.H. 38, 93 A.2d 661 (1953);
State v. Taylor, 46 N.J. 316, 217 A.2d 1 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855
(1966); State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156, 188 A.2d 10, cert. denied, 374 U.S.
852 (1963); State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 936 (1961); People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223
N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961); People v. Spano, 4 N.Y.S.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Thacker
v. State, 309 P.2d 306 (Okla. Cr. App. 1957); Hendrickson v. State, 229 P.2d
196 (Okla. Cr. App. 1951); State v. Shipley, 232 Ore. 354, 375 P.2d 237

(1962); State v. Nunn, 212 Ore. 546, 321 P.2d 356 (1958); Commonwealth
v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962) (dictum); Marrufo v. State,
172 Tex. Cr. 398, 357 S.W.2d 761 (1962); Childress v. State, 166 Tex. Cr.

95, 312 S.W.2d 247 (1958); Walker v. State, 162 Tex. Cr. 408, 286 S.W.2d
144 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 931 (1956); Reimers v. State, 31 Wis. 2d
457, 143 N.W.2d 525 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980 (1966); State ex rel.
Van Erman v. Burke, 30 Wis. 2d 324, 140 N.W.2d 737 (1966).
35.

Delaware:

Webster v. State, 213 A.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1965);

Vorhauser v. State, 212 A.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1965). Michigan: People
v. Ubbes, 374 Mich. 571, 132 N.W.2d 669 (1965); People v. McCager, 367
Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962); People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102
N.W.2d 738 (1960) (first case to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule).
36. In Vorhauser v. State, 212 A.2d 886, 892 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1965), it
was stated that the McNabb-Mallory rule would be applied only if the
delay in arraignment exceeded twenty-four hours.
37. See Vorhauser v. State, 212 A.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1965) and
People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960), the leading cases
on this problem in the respective states.
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The test applied in states which reject the exclusionary rule is
the traditional "voluntariness" test.3 8 A few states, while adhering firmly to the voluntariness criterion, concede that the length
of the delay between arrest and arraignment may be a factor in
considering whether the confession was completely voluntary 9 It
is difficult if not impossible, however, to find any case holding
that a particular delay was so unreasonable that it warranted absolute exclusion of a confession. Some jurisdictions are so unwilling to find a delay unreasonable that it is questionable whether a
delay is even
considered in determining the voluntariness of a
40
confession.
A small minority of states have taken a middle-of-the-road
approach. 41 Apparently these states feel that since a statute is
present, some effort should be made to see that it is enforced, but
they reject the thought of exclusion of the product of every violation. These courts demand that any causal connection between
the illegal delay and the incriminating statements be disproven
before the confession is admissible. 42 In State v. Traub,43 the Connecticut court said:
38. See, e.g., People v. Gauthier, 205 Cal. App. 2d 419, 22 Cal. Rptr.
888 (1962); People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680
(1961); State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 960 (1964); People v. Novak, 33 Ill. 2d 343, 211 N.E.2d 235 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1016 (1966); State v. Nelson, 139 Mont. 180, 362 P.2d 224
(1961); State v. Mihoy, 98 N.H. 38, 93 A.2d 661 (1953); Commonwealth
ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810 (1965); Commonwealth
ex rel. Light v. Maroney, 413 Pa. 254, 196 A.2d 659 (1964); Commonwealth
v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962).
39. See, e.g., People v. Hilliard, 221 Cal. App. 2d 719, 34 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1963); State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 960 (1964); State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966); Brown v. Justice's Court, 428 P.2d 376
(Sup. Ct. Nev. 1967); Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727
(1962) (dictum); Maruffo v. State, 172 Tex. Cr. 398, 357 S.W.2d 761 (1962);
Walker v. State, 162 Tex. Cr. 408, 286 S.W.2d 144 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 931 (1956).
40. Pennsylvania, for example, while hinting that the length of an
unreasonable delay is to be considered in determining the voluntariness
of a confession (Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727
(1962)), has also held that a delay of seven days (Commonwealth ex rel.
Light v. Maroney, 413 Pa. 254, 196 A.2d 659 (1964)), eight days (Commonwealth v. Graham, supra), and eight to ten days (Commonwealth ex rel.
Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810 (1965)) were perfectly reasonable.
41. California (See People v. Hilliard, 221 Cal. App. 2d 719, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 809 (1963)); Connecticut (See State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d
755 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964)); and Texas (See Maruffo v.
State, 172 Tex. Cr. 398, 357 S.W.2d 761 (1962); Walker v. State, 162 Tex.
Cr. 408, 286 S.W.2d 144 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 931 (1956)), at least,
have taken this approach.
42. The state is charged with the burden of proving the absence of
any such connection. See State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964).
43. Id.
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But even though, from the evidence produced, a confession made during an illegal detention is properly found
to have been truly voluntary, nevertheless, if the illegal
detention was an operative factor in causing or bringing
about the confession, then the confession will be considered the
fruit of the illegal detention and will be inadmis44
sible.
It is submitted that these decisions represent a more realistic approach than those which simply ignore the possible effect of an
unnecessarily prolonged detention. The hesitancy with which even
this causal requirement is utilized is evidence of a widespread dislike for the strict requirements of the McNabb-Mallory rule
among state courts.

THE RATIONALE

FOR THE RULE

The reasoning behind any form of the exclusionary rule is
basically twofold. First, the deterrence factor: exclusion of evidence illegally obtained forces law enforcement officials to refrain
from illegal practices and to rely instead upon sanctioned methods
of investigation and prosecution. Secondly, exclusion assures the
public that no person will be convicted on the basis of evidence
obtained in violation of his basic rights. Determining whether
violation of a 5(a)-type rule warrants application of the exclusionary rule-that is, which basic rights rule 5(a) protects-is
more difficult.
The classic reasons for the rule are no longer completely
sound. McNabb implied that one purpose of a prompt production
provision was to ensure that a criminal defendant would be advised of his rights by a committing magistrate, thereby precluding
incriminatory statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment privilege to remain silent.45 Miranda, however, by requiring
that detailed warnings be given immediately upon arrest, has
rendered this reason invalid. A second reason for prompt arraignment, as stated in McNabb, was to prevent "third degree"
tactics.

46

Because of the decline in recent years of resort to such

tactics and the suspicion with which every confession must be
viewed by a court, this reason, too, is of little validity.
Another classical reason for the rule, enunciated in United
States v. Mitchell, retains much of its merit today. This is the argument that prolonged questioning implies a degree of psychological
coercion which may render a confession less than completely voluntary. 47 As Mitchell held, it is not the length of the delay itself
44. 151 Conn. at 248, 196 A.2d at 757.
45. 318 U.S. at 343-44.
46. Id. See also Mallory, 354 U.S. at 452; Upshaw, 335 U.S. at 412;
Mitchell, 322 U.S. at 69-70.
47. 322 U.S. at 69-70.
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which is important; the length of time before the confession is obtained is controlling. Continuation of the delay subsequent to the
confession is immaterial, even though at some point thereafter the
delay becomes illegal. Although not all cases have followed this
reasoning, this fear of a coercive effect is apparently the major
reason for 5(a)-type rules today. 4 Of course, these rules also ensure that the disposition of a criminal case will not be unduly
delayed prior to arraignment.
The difficulty in the Mitchell reasoning is the impossibilty of
establishing a fixed time limit beyond which questioning becomes
coercive. But this is no reason why a time limit cannot be imposed which is brief enough to guarantee that a defendant will not
be "psychologically browbeaten." If additional restrictions were
imposed on police, such as requiring that all interrogations be recorded, 49 courts could be presented with tangible proof that a
given confession is completely voluntary.
That some attempt to formulate a workable solution to the
problem should be made is evidenced by the decisions of courts
which have literally followed the McNabb-Mallory rule. In Ricks
v. United States,50 the District of Columbia Circuit held that a
delay of thirty minutes between arrest and arraignment was prohibitive, and excluded an otherwise acceptable confession obtained
1 the
during this period. In Jones v. United States,"
same court
reached an even more absurd result. There the defendant was
advised of his rights and confessed within two to three minutes
of his arrest. The arresting officer discussed various aspects of the
confession with Jones for one and one-half to two hours, reduced
the confession to writing, and then immediately arraigned the defendant. There was no evidence that the confession had in any
way been coerced. Totally ignoring the reasoning in Mitchell,
the Jones court excluded all incriminating statements.5 2
These cases, although extreme examples, serve to demonstrate that even in federal courts, where literal application of
McNabb-Mallory would seem to be required, strict application is
48. It is contended that this was behind the Miranda Court's reasoning when they stated that its decision was not to overrule the McNabbMallory line of cases. See 384 U.S. at 463 n.32 (the note does not state
why McNabb-Mallory was still important).
49. See American Law Institute, Tentative Draft No. 1, A Model Code
of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure (1966), § 4.09(2) and (3) (hereinafter referred to as A.L.I. Code).
50. 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
51. 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
52. Some District of Columbia Circuit decisions have allowed the oral
confession to be admitted in similar circumstances, but not the typed confession. See Coleman v. United States, 317 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Naples
v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Jones v. United States,
307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It is submitted that this latter approach is
even more absurd than excluding all evidence of incriminating statements

in such circumstances.
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not always wise. Is it not "reasonable" to permit an arresting
officer to obtain particulars of a confession and reduce them to
writing before arraigning a person? No valid objection can be
made to admission of a voluntary confession obtained within a
brief period after arrest. A strict and literal application of the
exclusionary rule, as in Ricks and Jones, produces only an undesirable detrimental effect upon proper investigation procedures.
Furthermore, strict application of McNabb-Mallory does not
further the policy of the rule. Conceding that it is often possible
to arraign a person within a few minutes of his arrest and that
any delay beyond those few minutes may be termed a technical
violation of a 5 (a)-type statute, it cannot be said that exclusion of a
voluntary confession obtained during this interval will compel police to utilize more "approved" methods of investigation. In the
words of Professor Inbau: "Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are capable of
solution only by means of an admission from the guilty individual or upon the basis of information obtained from the questioning of other suspects. '53 Even when a confession is not absolutely necessary for a conviction, a prosecutor may go to trial
relying almost entirely upon a confession only to have an acquittal
result when the confession is excluded because of a delay which
both he and the police justifiably felt was entirely reasonable.
On the other hand, by ignoring the McNabb-Mallory rule, state
decisions have proven that absent the exclusionary rule, there is
virtually no method of enforcing prompt production statutes. Internal sanctions upon police violations have historically been few.
Even some form of workable punishment would not in any event
protect the rights of the immediate defendant. The exclusionary
rule, therefore, has evolved through a process of elimination to
become the only presently effective means of both checking illegal police activities and protecting the victim of these activities.
This does not mean, however, that the exclusionary principle is the
only possible answer.
Accepting the contention that some questioning of an accused
prior to arraignment may be desirable, or at least is not prohibitive, the problem is to establish a permissible period for such questioning and a punishment factor for violations. The latter factor
must not only deter future violations, but must also ensure that
the immediate defendant will not be prejudiced by a violation.
It is submitted that for merely technical violations which do not
prejudice the defendant, a harmless error test could be applied.
Although not required in state courts, since an undue delay in arraignment is not violative of a federal constitutional right, the
53. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme
Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948).
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federal standard of harmless error 54 should be applied for this
purpose in all jurisdictions. The test would require the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the illegal detention did
not in any way produce or cause the incriminating statements before the confession could be admitted into evidence. For a flagrant
violation, or one made in bad faith, automatic exclusion would
seem to be the only effective solution.
The problem of establishing a maximum permissible period of
questioning before arraignment remains. Possible solutions to the
problem will be discussed in the next section.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

The most recent suggestion directed to the problem of incustody pre-arraignment detention and questioning is found in the
American Law Institute's Proposed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.55 Although these proposals represent much detailed analysis of this area, an effort will be made to modify
certain provisions in the hope that the end result will be more
acceptable to the legislatures.
The Institute has taken the position that the only detention
permissible between arrest and arraignment is for questioning of a
person arrested without a warrant, and then only about certain
specified subjects. Section 4.04(1) of the Model Code provides in
part: "If a person is arrested without a warrant, he may be detained for a period of preliminary screening [not to exceed four
hours] 5 6 for the purpose of determining whether a complaint should
be issued charging him with a crime." A "period of further screening" is provided for certain arrests without a warrant:
If there is reasonable cause to believe that the arrested
person has committed, or has conspired or attempted to
commit [any of a specified number of "serious" felonies]
and that further investigation and custody are necessary in
order to determine whether the arrested person should be
charged with such a felony, the station officer may ...
order the arrested person to be detained for a period of
further screening. The station officer may also make such
an order in the case of any other felony, but only if the
arrested person is represented by counsel and both the arrested person and his counsel consent. 7
Depending upon what time of day the arrest is made, this period of
further screening may be as long as twenty-two hours.58 The pur54. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh. denied, 386
U.S. 987 (1967). See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Wade
v.United States, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
55. Tentative Draft No. 1 (1966).
56. A.L.I. Code § 4.04(6).
57. A.L.I. Code § 4.04(6).
58. Id. § 4.05(1).
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pose of these screening periods purports to be solely to determine
whether and with what to charge the arrested person.59 The Code
is quite explicit concerning the investigation permissible during
these periods. Investigation is limited to: fingerprinting and photographing the accused; conducting a lineup or other reasonable
identification procedures; confronting the arrested person with
an alleged accomplice or witness; and confronting him with any
evidence or information gained during investigation of the crime. 0
The arrested person may also be asked whether he wishes to make
a statement, and to clarify any such statement.61 These periods
are the only provisions in the Code permitting questioning in the
absence of counsel, or without the consent of both the accused and
his counsel.62 When the arrest is made with a warrant, however,
no interrogation whatsoever may take place prior to arraignment.63
It is submitted that this distinction drawn between arrests
made pursuant to a warrant and those made in the absence of a
warrant is neither desirable nor based on firm reasoning. In
explanation of their position, the Institute states: "[T]he draft
rejects the premise that an arrest without a warrant can properly
be made only when a formal charge of crime is justified.

...

,4

This view completely ignores decisions which indicate that the
standard for an arrest without a warrant is the same as that required to obtain a warrant-probable cause.6 5 The fourth amendment to the Constitution specifies that probable cause is necessary to support an arrest warrant. It follows that a lesser standard cannot possibly be accepted for an arrest without a warrant.66
Assuming this distinction to be without substance, it does not
necessarily follow that questioning prior to arraignment should
never be permitted. Rather, it is suggested that the screening pe59. Id.
60. Id. §§ 5.01, 5.08.
61. A.L.I. Code § 5.08(2).
62. Questioning in the presence of defendant's counsel, or with the
consent of both the defendant and his counsel, remains permissible at virtually all stages of the pretrial procedure. See §§ 4.04(6), 4.06(1), 5.01(1),
5.08.
It should also be noted that Miranda stated that at no time after a
person is taken into custody may he be interrogated in the absence of
counsel, unless the defendant has fully and intelligently waived counsel or
counsel's presence at that time. Furthermore, if at any time during any
pretrial proceeding, the defendant expresses a desire to stop any further
questioning, all interrogation must cease. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
63. A.L.I. Code §§4.06(1), 5.09.
64. Id. Note on section 4.04.
65. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
66. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), the Supreme Court gave some
indication that upon similar facts, an arrest with a warrant would be more
likely to be upheld than would one made without a warrant. Thus, any
contention that a lesser standard would be needed to support an arrest
without a warrant would seem fallacious.
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riods provided by the Code be carried over to all arrests. It is
further contended, despite the reporters' explanation to the contrary, 67 that the Code did not contemplate use of the screening
periods solely to determine whether and with what to charge the
person arrested. One of the activities permitted during these
periods is confrontation of the suspect with any evidence or information obtained during investigation of the crime. 8 How
this would aid in determining whether to charge the suspect is
unknown-unless the suspect utters an incriminating statement
when so confronted. The seemingly obvious intent of this confrontation is to prompt a statement. There is no reason, however,
why this procedure should not be permitted; it is neither coercive
nor abusive. On the contrary, it may prove extremely expeditious.
The Code also permits police to ask a suspect whether he wishes
to make a statement, and to clarify any such statement 9 Again,
the only way in which this could aid in determining whether to
charge a person with a crime is by prompting an incriminating
statement. If this is permissible screening of a person arrested
without a warrant, there would seem to be no valid reason for
precluding similar questioning of a person arrested with a warrant.
If the protection required by Miranda is afforded all persons arrested, no inherent danger would be involved in such questioning.
To further assure that no "involuntary" confession is used against a
defendant, the Code requires that a record be kept of all incustodial interrogation. 70 Thus, if the validity of a confession
made during this period is questioned at trial or on appeal, the
court would have at hand virtually everything necessary to guarantee a just determination of the issue.
The Code provisions concerning the permissible period of questioning between arrest and arraignment are essentially satisfactory.
The period of "preliminary screening" is not to exceed four
hours. 71 Unless permission for a period of further screening is
obtained, all questioning of the accused must cease at this point
and no statements obtained thereafter may be used against the
defendant 72 unless made
in the presence of counsel or after con73
sultation with counsel.
The period of further screening is purportedly to determine
whether and with what offense to charge the suspect. Assuming,
however, that this is not an entirely valid purpose-since probable
cause to arrest the suspect in connection with some specific crime
must have existed at the time of the arrest-the reasons for
67. See A.L.I. Code, Note on section 5.01, at 42.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. §§ 5.08(2) (a), 5.01(e).
A.L.I. Code §§ 5.08(2) (a), (b).
Id. § 4.09(2), (3).
A.L.I. Code § 4.04(6).
Id. § 9.06 (3).
A.L.I. Code § 9.04(4). See also Note on section 9.06, at 72.
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permitting extended questioning should be stated with more particularity. When the suspect is possibly connected with additional
offenses, or when accomplices are sought, police should be permitted to question the arrested person for a longer period of time.
Also, when the crime with which the suspect is connected involves
the public welfare, or the release of the suspect would endanger
another person, prolonged questioning would be desirable. Absent such limitations upon the granting of a period of further
screening, abuse of the privilege is invited.
Two additional modifications of these provisions are suggested.
The Code provides that even volunteered statements made after
the screening periods must be excluded. 74 This proscription is
needlessly strict. Undoubtedly this provision is intended to assure
that a "volunteered" statement is not in reality the product of illegal interrogation. If the prosecution is required to prove the voluntariness of a post-screening statement as a condition to its admissibility, however, by the harmless error standard previously
suggested, there would be no reason for absolute exclusion. Some
interrogation must necessarily take place at this time, if for no other
reason than to clarify the defendant's expression. The Code itself
expresses a desire not to be bound by such minor infractions. 75
The second suggested modification pertains to waiver of the
right to have counsel present during interrogation. With the exception of the provisions concerning screening, the Code does not
mention waiver. Since even under Miranda a voluntary and intelligent waver is permissible, it would seem advisable to authorize
waiver in the Code. Proof of the waiver's authenticity would of
course be mandatory.
CONCLUSION

That there is a definite need for a modified application of the
exclusionary rule to voluntary incriminating statements made during a period of illegal detention is amply demonstrated by the
state and federal decisions following McNabb. Literal application
of the rule has produced harsh and absurd results. Courts which
have ignored the McNabb-Mallory rule, on the other hand, render
the rule completely ineffective as a deterrent of illegal official
conduct.
Hopefully the provisions of the Model Code with the suggested
modifications would establish a workable solution to the problem.
74. A.L.I. Code, Note on section 9.04, at 68.
75. The Commentary to Article 9, at 208-09, states: "It
patently undesirable to provide in the Code that a violation by
means that all statements thereafter made must be excluded
dence. The violations should be curable if coercive effects are

would be
an officer
from evidissipated,

so that a statement voluntarily made thereafter becomes usable in evidence." It is submitted that the very act of a defendant volunteering information would be sufficient to cure any technical illegality present in
questioning at this time.
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Relatively fixed time periods for questioning before arraignment are
supplied. A requirement that the defendant be arraigned as
quickly as possible following the screening periods would lend
itself readily to proof or disproof of compliance. Noncompliance
would raise a presumption that any delay longer than that necessary to physically produce a person before a magistrate is per se
illegal.
To further assure the voluntariness of confessions obtained
during a pre-arraignment delay, the prosecution would be required
to prove the absence of a causal connection between the delay for
screening purposes and the incriminating statements. Strict compliance with the Code would create a strong presumption of voluntariness and a harmless error standard would be available to
mitigate the effect of technical infractions.
It is suggested that the legislatures give serious attention to
the modified provisions of the Model Code. The McNabb-Mallory
rule of exclusion could then achieve its proper status as a final
check on flagrant violations of prompt arraignment statutes and
rules.
JEFFREY C. MUNNF. L

